Microsoft Entra ID hardening checklist
Work in this order: build two break-glass accounts, block legacy authentication, then enforce MFA. The order is the part that matters. A Conditional Access policy can lock every administrator out of the tenant, so the accounts that get you back in have to exist before the first policy does, and MFA can be bypassed entirely until legacy protocols are blocked.
Everything after that is privilege and evidence: fewer than five Global Administrators, least-privileged roles for everyone else, and sign-in logs going somewhere they will survive an incident. Download the checklist below and cut what does not apply to the tenant in front of you.
Before you change anything
- Review the sign-in logs for legacy authentication and list every account and device still using it
- Identify service accounts, printers and applications on
POP,IMAP,SMTP AUTHor Exchange ActiveSync with basic auth - Move those senders onto dedicated accounts or a proper SMTP relay before anything is blocked
- Keep
Security Defaultsenabled if the tenant needs no exceptions - Build Conditional Access policies in
report-onlymode first where exceptions are required
Break-glass accounts
- Create two cloud-only Global Administrator accounts in the
.onmicrosoft.comdomain, not synced from on-premises Active Directory - Exclude both from every Conditional Access policy, including the MFA ones
- Use long random passwords, stored offline and physically, split so no one person holds a whole credential
- Alert on any sign-in to either account
- Test both accounts on a schedule
Block legacy authentication
- Create a Conditional Access policy targeting
All users - Set client apps to
Exchange ActiveSync clientsandOther clients - Set the access control to
Block - Exclude the two break-glass accounts from the policy
- Confirm in the sign-in logs that legacy protocol traffic has stopped
Multi-factor authentication
- Manage every MFA setting in the converged
Authentication methodspolicy - Enforce MFA for administrators first, through Conditional Access rather than the per-user MFA toggles
- Extend the MFA requirement to
All users - Set FIDO2 security keys, passkeys or Windows Hello for Business as the primary method
- Turn on number matching and additional context for Microsoft Authenticator
- Keep SMS and voice calls as fallback methods only
Administrator and user privilege
- Reduce Global Administrators to fewer than five
- Assign the least-privileged role that does the job:
Helpdesk Administrator,User Administrator,Exchange Administrator,Security ReaderorGlobal Reader - Turn on Privileged Identity Management so privileged roles are eligible rather than permanent, where Entra ID P2 is licensed
- Set
Users can register applicationstoNo - Set
Restrict access to the Microsoft Entra admin centretoYes, treating it as tidiness rather than a security boundary - Decide deliberately on who may create security groups and Microsoft 365 groups
- Restrict user consent for applications and enable the admin consent workflow
- Set
Guest user accessto the most restrictive option and restrict who may invite guests - Review guests regularly and expire them with access reviews where the licensing allows
- Roll the
AZUREADSSOACCKerberos decryption key every 30 days wherever that computer account exists in Active Directory - Exclude privileged on-premises accounts from directory synchronisation
Logging and rollout
- Route sign-in and audit diagnostic settings to a Log Analytics workspace, a storage account or a SIEM
- Keep the logs for as long as the organisation's obligations require, set up before an incident rather than during one
- Require MFA on sign-in risk at medium and above, where Entra ID P2 is licensed
- Require a secure password change on user risk at high, where Entra ID P2 is licensed
- Run every new policy in
report-onlymode and read the impact before enabling it - Confirm the break-glass exclusions survived each policy change
Frequently asked questions
What should I do first when taking over an Entra ID tenant?
Create two cloud-only break-glass Global Administrator accounts before changing anything else, then block legacy authentication, then enforce MFA. Break-glass accounts come first because a Conditional Access policy can lock out every administrator including the person who wrote it. The full order is in our walkthrough of securing a tenant.
Why block legacy authentication before enforcing MFA?
Legacy protocols such as POP and IMAP cannot present a second factor, so they bypass MFA rather than failing it. Until legacy auth is blocked with a Conditional Access policy targeting Exchange ActiveSync clients and Other clients, an MFA requirement is not actually enforced.
How many Global Administrators should a tenant have?
Fewer than five, per Microsoft's guidance. Everyone else gets the least-privileged role that does their job. Global Reader is the read-only twin of Global Administrator and covers most of what people ask Global Administrator for.
Is Security Defaults enough on its own?
Security Defaults is a reasonable baseline for a tenant that needs no exceptions. Once the tenant needs exceptions, move to Conditional Access and build the policies in report-only mode first, because Security Defaults and Conditional Access cannot both be on.
Identity is half the job. The endpoints are the other half.
Moorfox scores every managed machine on patch age, disk encryption and local administrator count, so the workstation side of a tenant audit fills itself in while you work through the identity side.